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Abstract: Voting systems aggregate preferences efficiently and are often used for deciding conservation
priorities. Desirable characteristics of voting systems include transitivity, completeness, and Pareto optimality,
among others. Voting systems that are common and potentially useful for environmental decision making
include simple majority, approval, and preferential voting. Unfortunately, no voting system can guarantee an
outcome, while also satisfying a range of very reasonable performance criteria. Furthermore, voting methods
may be manipulated by decision makers and strategic voters if they have knowledge of the voting patterns
and alliances of others in the voting populations. The difficult properties of voting systems arise in routine
decision making when there are multiple criteria and management alternatives. Because each method has
flaws, we do not endorse one method. Instead, we urge organizers to be transparent about the properties of
proposed voting systems and to offer participants the opportunity to approve the voting system as part of the
ground rules for operation of a group.
Keywords: Arrow’s theorem, decision theory, philosophy, preferences
Sistemas de Votacio´n para Decisiones Ambientales
Resumen: Los sistemas de votacio´n agregan preferencias eficientemente y muy seguido se usan para decidir
prioridades de conservacio´n. Las caracter´ısticas deseables de un sistema de votacio´n incluyen la transitividad,
lo completo que sean y la optimalidad de Pareto, entre otras. Los sistemas de votacio´n que son comunes
y potencialmente u´tiles para la toma de decisiones ambientales incluyen simple mayor´ıa, aprobacio´n y
votacio´n preferencial. Desafortunadamente, ningu´n sistema de votacio´n puede garantizar un resultado y a
la vez satisfacer un rango de criterios de desempen˜o muy razonable. Adema´s, los me´todos de votacio´n pueden
manipularse por los que toman las decisiones y votantes estrate´gicos si tienen el conocimiento de los patrones
de votacio´n y de las alianzas entre miembros dentro de las poblaciones votantes. Las propiedades dif´ıciles
de los sistemas de votacio´n sobresalen en las tomas de decisiones rutinarias cuando hay criterios mu´ltiples
y alternativas de manejo. Ya que ambos me´todos tienen fallas, no apoyamos a uno sobre el otro. En lugar
de esto le pedimos urgentemente a los organizadores ser transparentes con respecto a las propiedades de los
sistemas de votacio´n y ofrecer a los participantes la oportunidad de aprobar el sistema de votacio´n como
parte de las reglas ba´sicas para la operacio´n de un grupo.
Palabras Clave: Filosof´ıa, preferencias, teorema de Arrow, teor´ıa de decisio´n
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Introduction
Environmental decisions lie at the interface of science and
public policy. Scientists provide technical understanding,
data, expert judgment, and predictions of the outcomes
of alternative scenarios (Morgan & Henrion 1990; Cooke
1991; Burgman 2005; Patterson et al. 2007). Decisions
also depend on the preferences of stakeholders: people
interested in or affected by a decision. Stakeholders of-
ten have disparate values, interests, and prefer different
tradeoffs among environmental, social, cultural, and eco-
nomic criteria. Inevitably, differences of opinion arise
(Slovic 1999; Maguire 2004). How should policy makers
reconcile these divergent preferences to make decisions?
Voting is used widely to choose options, often because
of its ease of application (e.g., Ghanbarpour et al. 2005).
In conservation planning, it is used most often in infor-
mal settings to generate group preferences (e.g., Dicks
et al. 2010). Despite its pervasiveness and practical ap-
peal, there has been no systematic evaluation of voting for
environmental applications. Importantly, different voting
systems can generate different outcomes, even given
the same underlying preferences. Yet, voting systems
often are used unthinkingly and many people are un-
aware of the implications of choosing one voting system
or another. The most familiar voting system allocates
one vote per participant, and the alternative with the
most votes is selected. However, this system has serious
shortcomings, and there are many other voting systems
with different and potentially more useful properties. We
illustrate how different systems can generate different
outcomes and describe the strengths and weaknesses
of the alternatives, encouraging conservation biologists
to think about desirable properties of different voting
methods.
We examine how voting can be used to aggregate opin-
ions about values and preferred strategies, rather than
how voting can aggregate beliefs about facts. We assume
that participants (voters) and the alternatives are known;
group member selection and identification of stakehold-
ers and feasible alternatives have been discussed else-
where (e.g., Keeney 1992; Burgman 2005; Burgman et al.
2011).We also ignore themany psychological factors that
influence group decisions (Slovic 1999; Kerr & Tindale
2004).
This review focuses on a subset of voting systems with
the greatest potential utility for environmental decision
making. We describe simple majority, approval voting,
and preferential voting and outline 2 approaches with
very long histories of application, the Borda count and
Condorcet functions. We evaluate the mathematical and
cognitive properties of these systems, identify circum-
stances in which voting system attributes are likely to
be important, and describe how voters may manipulate
systems. We conclude with recommendations for using
voting systems for environmental decisions.
Methods
We searched the ISIWeb of Science from1990 to 2012 for
papers describing votingmethods using “voting,” “prefer-
ence aggregation,” and “group decision.” We used terms
discovered in this initial search (decision, environment,
conservation, group, vote, and preference) to find ap-
plications of voting methods in ecology, conservation
biology, and environmental science. References in these
papers were used to identify additional studies that ap-
plied a votingmethod to aggregate individual preferences
for environmental issues. In total we found 21 articles
that used at least one of the voting methods focused on
in this study or that used a variation of them that was
relevant or that illustrated their use. We cite and discuss
the applications in the relevant sections of the review.
Concepts and Notation
We devised a formal notation for the voting systems de-
scribed below. Group decisions involve sets of individ-
uals, I, alternatives, A, and preferences, P. We let I =
{Ii : i = 1, 2, . . . , m} be the set of m individuals, A =
{Aj : j = 1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of n alternatives, and
P = {Pi : i = 1, 2, . . . , m} be the set of preferences of
the individuals in I, where Pi is a set of preferences over
A for individual Ii. Voting methods for group decisions
involve evaluating the set of alternatives, A, on the basis
of individual preferences, P.
A group evaluation takes the form of an ordering, R, of
alternatives which indicates, for each pair of alternatives
Aj, Ak, whether the group prefers Aj to Ak, prefers Ak
to Aj, or is indifferent between the two. Group decision
methods thus define a function,W, on P such thatW(P)=
R. Following Arrow (1951),W is described as a social wel-
fare function. For the purposes of this review, a voting
method combines a protocol for determining individual
preferences with a social welfare function W to identify
the set of alternatives the group prefers to all others, from
the set of individual preferences, P. We ignore quantita-
tive information and focus solely on the ordinal prefer-
ence information of P to identify that set of alternatives.
We assume initially that P includes enough information
about preferences of individuals in I to define a prefer-
ence relation, i, on A for each individual Ii ∈ I, where
the alternative Aj i Ak if and only if individual Ii prefers
Aj to Ak.
Let i represent “strict preference” and define ≥i as
the “weak preference” of Ii for Aj over Ak (i.e., where
Aj ≥i Ak means individual Ii prefers or is indifferent to Aj
over Ak) and ∼i as “indifference” (i.e., where Aj ∼i Ak
means individual Ii is indifferent between them).
Ordinal preferences refer to ranks of preferences. A
preference relation i defines an ordinal value function
Oi: A → R on A where Oi(Aj) > Oi(Ak) if and only if Aj
i Ak. The O therefore indicates the results of pairwise
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comparisons of alternatives, that is, whether Aj i Ak, Ak
i Ai, or Ai ∼i Ak.
Properties of an ideal system
Different ways of considering preferences can lead to
different decisions. For example, consider 7 stakeholders
who must decide which of 3 environmental strategies is
best. The alternatives are A1 maximize harvest, A2 pro-
tect threatened species, andA3 maximize public amenity.
Three stakeholders prefer A1 to A2 and A2 to A3 (i.e., A1 >
A2 > A3). Two stakeholders prefer A2 to A1 and A1 to A3
(i.e., A2 > A1 > A3). Two prefer A3 to A2 and A2 to
A1 (i.e., A3 > A2 > A1). Alternative A1 gets 3 first place
votes, and each of the other alternatives only gets 2. But a
clear majority (4 of 7) prefers A2 to A1. Which alternative
should the policy maker select?
Three appealing properties of any voting system are
transitivity, completeness, and the Pareto principle.
(1) Transitivity requires that if an individual or the group
prefers A1 over A2 (O(A1)  O(A2)) and A2 over A3
(O(A1)  O(A3)), then they prefer A1 over A3 (O(A1)
 O(A3)). Consider a group that prefers to maximize
harvest to protect threatened species and prefers to
protect threatened species over maximizing public
amenity. If the group is given the choice to max-
imize harvest or public amenity, transitivity means
they would prefer to maximize harvest.
(2) The Pareto principle states that if A1 is preferred
to A2 by all individuals, then the group should also
prefer A1 over A2. More generally, Pareto efficiency
(or Pareto optimality) means that if the group pref-
erence is A1  A2, it implies A1 is better than A2
from the perspective of at least one person and no
one regards it as worse. Thus, if protecting public
amenity in the example above is the least preferred
of the 3 alternatives for all individuals, then the voting
system should not select it.
(3) Completeness requires the voting system give a
group preference for all of the alternatives in A.
There are other appealing properties of voting systems.
For example, we may wish to select the alternative that
would defeat every other alternative in one-on-one (pair-
wise) comparisons. Other desirable properties may be
social or psychological. For example, it may be impor-
tant that all members of the group understand how the
voting system works (Elkind et al. 2011). Others writing
about desirable properties of voting systems (Armbruster
& Boge 1983; Fishburn & Brams 1983; Hwang & Lin
1987; Saari 2001; Hodge&Klima 2005; Poundstone 2008;
Elkind et al. 2011) have proposed the following:
Homogeneity: The result of a vote depends on the pro-
portions of the total number of votes assigned to each
alternative, and not on their absolute counts.
Monotonicity: Increasing the number of votes for a win-
ning alternative cannot make it a loser, and a losing
alternative cannot become a winner when its number
of votes decreases.
Anonymity: Voters are treated the same in the sense that
if any 2 individuals trade their votes, the outcomewould
be the same.
Decisiveness: The voting systemdelivers an unambiguous
winner or a winning set, if more than one alternative is
desired.
Consistency: If a group is divided into subgroups and
each subgroup selects the same alternative, then the
entire group also selects that alternative.
Invulnerability to the no-show paradox: It is not possible
for a group of voters to obtain their first-ranked choice
by abstaining if voting would lead to the selection of
some other option.
Although each of these properties seems intuitively
desirable, some have several interpretations, some are
inconsequential in many situations, some are mutually
exclusive and others have undesirable implications in
some circumstances.
Arrow (1951) proved that when 3 or more alternatives
exist, no voting system can convert voter preferences
into a Pareto efficient, complete, and transitive rankwhile
satisfying these very reasonable criteria:
(1) If every individual prefers A1 to A2, then the group
should prefer A1 to A2.
(2) There should be no individual in the group who
can determine the group’s preferences (no dicta-
torship). More formally, there is no individual i
such that A1  A2 implies the social choice of A1
over A2 regardless of the preferences of all other
individuals.
(3) The solution should be independent of irrelevant al-
ternatives. That is, the ranking of A1 relative to A2
should not depend upon the introduction of another
alternative, A3.
The importance of these and other intuitively desir-
able properties depends on the context in which a vot-
ing system is applied. For example, when choosing one
alternative, completeness may not be important. Votes
may be used to choose a subset of acceptable alterna-
tives, unranked, in which case resolving all ties is not
essential. Anonymity may not be desired when votes
are deliberately weighted unequally, reflecting, for ex-
ample, the number of shares individuals hold in a pub-
lic company. Some voting systems may not guarantee
a clear winner, but if there are many more individuals
than alternatives, an indecisive outcome may be very
unlikely.
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Table 1. Hypothetical ordinal preferences of 2 groups (a, b) of 2 in-
dividuals (I) for 3 alternatives (A).
(a) A1 A2 A3 (b) A1 A2 A3
I1 1 2 3 I1 1 2 3
I2 2 1 3 I2 3 1 2
I3 1 2 2 I3 2 3 1
Note: In (a) individual I3 is indifferent to the choice between A2 and
A3.
Voting Systems
Return to the hypothetical example outlined above in
which a group of stakeholders is asked for their prefer-
ences for 3 mutually exclusive environmental strategies,
each of which has a different focus: A1 maximize harvest,
A2 protect threatened species, and A3 maximize public
amenity. The preferences expressed by 2 groups of 3
individuals (I) are arranged in Table 1.
Removing Dominated Alternatives
The simplest defensible action a decisionmaker canmake
is removing “dominated” alternatives. In general, domi-
nated alternatives are not the favorite of any individual.
Therefore, in Table 1a, the alternative set is reduced to
A1 and A2. However, this does not provide a complete
ranking of the remaining alternatives, A1 and A2, which
are Pareto efficient alternatives (i.e., they are preferred
by at least one individual).
This approach (removing dominated alternatives) is
used in multicriteria decision analysis to simplify prob-
lems (e.g., Gregory & Keeney 2002). Ha¨ma¨la¨inen et al.
(2001) used it to analyze 5 water level management
plans for a lake-river system in Finland involving 10
groups of stakeholders, including power producers, farm-
ers, environmentalists, recreational users, and fishers and
10 ecological, economic, and sociological criteria.
Simple Majority (Plurality) Voting
Under simple majority voting, each voter has one vote,
which may be cast for a single alternative. Thus, stake-
holders cannot express their preferences for all of the
alternatives; they merely identify their best option. Un-
der simple majority voting, the aggregation rule is to sum
the votes for each alternative. The alternative with the
most votes is selected. There is no requirement that an
alternative acquire a majority (>50%) of votes.
In antiplurality voting, individuals apply a single veto.
The alternative with the largest number of vetoes is re-
moved. The set of alternatives may be reduced to a de-
sired size through successive vetoes (Armbruster & Boge
1983).
Consider the preferences of 9 individuals for 3 alterna-
tives (Table 2). Under simple majority voting, A1 would
Table 2. Hypothetical ordinal preferences of 9 individuals (I) for 3
alternatives (A).
A1 A2 A3
I1 1 2 3
I2 1 2 3
I3 1 2 3
I4 1 3 2
I5 3 2 1
I6 3 2 1
I7 3 2 1
I8 3 1 2
I9 3 1 2
Votes 4 2 3
be selected, even though 5 of the 9 individuals prefer
either A2 or A3 to A1. Thus, the preference ordering sug-
gested by the count of votes in Table 1 may not capture
the full set of individual preferences and may result in un-
satisfactory choices from the perspective of the majority.
Below, we discuss how this property may be exploited
to deliver outcomes at odds with the preferences of the
majority of voters.
Above we noted that transitivity is a desirable property
of a voting system. Unfortunately, if more than 2 alterna-
tives exist, simple majority voting may not be transitive
(Arrow 1951; Dodgson 1876; Gehrlein 1983). For exam-
ple, consider the case in Table 1b, where 3 individuals
specify their preferences for the 3 alternatives.
For A1 and A2, Oi(A1) > Oi(A2) holds for 2 individuals
and Oi(A2) > Oi(A1) holds for one individual. Thus, R =
(A1 > A2).
For A2 and A3, Oi(A2) > Oi(A3) holds for 2 individuals
and Oi(A3) > Oi(A2) holds for one individual. Thus, R =
(A2 > A3).
For A1 and A3,Oi(A1) > Oi(A3) holds for one individual
and Oi(A3) > Oi(A1) holds for 2 individuals. Thus, R =
(A3 > A1).
Thus, for this set, R is not transitive.
Another drawback of simple majority voting is that
the preference of the group for one of 2 alternatives
can be influenced by the inclusion or exclusion of other
alternatives. For example, if we were to remove A3 from
Table 2 and reassign the preferences, then A1 would
have 4 votes and A2 would have 5. The votes for A2
have been effectively split between A2 and A3. If every
choice involved only 2 alternatives, then the outcome
could be determined equitably and consistently through
simple majority voting. If there are many alternatives,
the winner may attract only a small percentage of total
votes cast, which may be unsatisfying even if it does
not violate any of the other desirable qualities listed
above.
Given the potential frailties of simple majority voting,
it is perhaps surprising how widely it is used to make
environmental management decisions. Examples include
Conservation Biology
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Table 3. Hypothetical approval votes cast by the 9 individuals (I) in
Table 2 for 3 alternatives (A).
A1 A2 A3
I1 1 1
I2 1 1
I3 1 1
I4 1 1
I5 1 1
I6 1 1
I7 1 1
I8 1 1
I9 1 1
Votes 4 8 6
nomenclatural decisions in taxonomy (e.g., McNeill &
Turland 2010). (Although, interestingly, for the naming
of Acacia, a 60% majority threshold was required.) In
environmental management it has been used to identify
a preferred management strategy for threatened species
(Marcot et al. 2006) and to identify preferred forest man-
agement options (Kangas et al. 2006; Hiltunen et al.
2008). Tisdell et al. (2006) used it to assess preferences
for conservation objectives for Australian vertebrates. In
Chile, members of the National Fisheries Council vote on
proposals for total allowable catch by a simple majority
vote (Leal et al. 2010).
Approval Voting
In approval voting (Brams 2004) individuals select all
alternatives of which they approve. The alternative(s)
with the most votes is (are) selected. Generally, the op-
tion with the greatest overall support attracts the largest
number of votes (Brams 2004). To illustrate its proper-
ties, we use Table 2 and specify that the 9 individuals
who expressed preferences would approve of their first
and second choices but not their third. Other configura-
tions of approvals would lead to different results. Their
approval votes would be as in Table 3.
In this example, A2 would be selected. Approval voting
has the advantage over simple majority voting in that its
results are transitive and it captures more information
about the preference set P. However, it can generate
counter-intuitive outcomes from the perspective of the
choice of a single, most-preferred alternative. In this
example, A2 was selected even though the fewest vot-
ers preferred it (Table 2). If a second alternative were
selected based on the approval vote, it would be A3, even
though most voters preferred A1. Nevertheless, most vot-
ers considered A2 to be good enough. Approval voting
tends to promote moderate alternatives that may be sat-
isfactory but not ideal from any one perspective (Kangas
& Kangas 2002).
Approval voting is used widely to identify group pref-
erences in ecology and conservation biology. Sutherland
et al. (2009) (see also Morton et al. 2009) used Approval
voting to reduce a long list of global conservation ques-
tions to a more manageable list. In Brown et al. (2010),
each participant allocated 10 votes among 94 water re-
search questions, and the questions with the most votes
were selected, creating a priority list of 15 questions.
Vignola et al. (2012) used it to identify acceptable alter-
natives for the management of a catchment, reconciling
the priorities of upstream farmers with downstream hy-
dropower producers. Kangas et al. (2006) reviewed its
application to choices in forest management.
Preferential Voting
Preferential voting and the Borda count (following) use
the entire preference order to determine R. Preferen-
tial voting (also called alternative vote or instant run-off)
is designed to give equitable consideration to the full
range of each voter’s preferences. Under this system,
if an alternative receives sufficient first preferences to
achieve a quota (i.e., a minimum number of votes), it is
selected. If no alternative achieves sufficient votes, the
votes allocated to the least popular alternative are redis-
tributed (transferred) to the remaining alternatives with
the following procedure. Remove the alternativewith the
fewest primary votes. If there is a tie, remove the alter-
native with the fewest second preferences among those
that tie. If there is a second tie, remove the alternative
with the fewest third preferences among those that tie,
and so on.
When there arem voters andmore than one alternative
is to be selected, transfers are made sequentially until
n alternatives attain the quota needed for election. The
quota, Q, is usually defined as (Fishburn & Brams 1983),
Q = [m/(n+1)] + 1, (1)
where the brackets indicate the integer part of the argu-
ment.
In Table 4, all 3 alternatives are scored first once, butA3
is never scored second, so it is removed. Of the remaining
alternatives,A1 andA2,A2 has the fewest first preferences
so it is removed. Thus, R = (A1 > A2 > A3).
In preferential voting, an alternative that would at-
tract the most votes in simple majority voting or an
alternative that can defeat every other alternative in
direct-comparison (one-on-one) voting (i.e., the Con-
dorcet winner; see below) might not be selected (Fish-
burn & Brams 1983). Preferential voting may violate the
monotonicity criterion, such that an increase in support
for an alternative may turn it from a winner into a loser.
In Table 5 decision 1, the fewest people prefer option
A2. It so happens that all of the voters who prefer A2
also prefer A3 over A1. Their votes in round 2 transfer to
option A3, which is selected.
Conservation Biology
Volume 28, No. 2, 2014
Burgman et al. 327
Table 4. Hypothetical ordinal preferences of 3 individuals (I) for 3
alternatives (A) after the first round of voting and the second round of
voting when preferences delineated in the first round are applied.
First round Second round
A1 A2 A3 A1 A2
I1 1 2 3 1 2
I2 2 3 1 1 2
I3 2 1 3 2 1
Table 5. Example of preferential voting showing how an increase in
support for an alternative can turn it from a winner into a loser. Num-
bers in the table are the number of votes received for each alternative.
A1 A2 A1
Decision 1
Round 1 11 8 10
Round 2 11 18
Decision 2
Round 1 7 8 14
Round 2 15 14
Note: The only change between decision 1 and decision 2 is that in
Decision 2, support for A3 increases in the form of 4 votes moving
from A1 to A3.
In decision 2, the only change is that support for A3
increases, with 4 votes being transferred from A1 to A3.
As a result, A1 is removed first. It so happens that all
of the voters who prefer A1 also prefer A2 over A3. The
preferences associated with A1 transfer to A2, which is
selected over A3. The outcome is that A3 is no longer se-
lected even though support for it increased. Although this
counter-intuitive outcome is possible, it required quite
an unusual distribution of preferences (namely, all voters
who prefer A2 also prefer A3 over A1 and all voters who
prefer A1 also prefer A2 over A3). This raises the question
of whether such arrangements of preferences are likely
to arise in practice. We explore this question below.
Despite the appeal of systems that incorporate each
individual’s full set of preferences, we could find no ex-
amples of preferential voting in environmental science
or conservation decision making. It is implemented in
many jurisdictions in Australia to choose political repre-
sentatives and has affected the development of public
environmental policy there (Williams 2006).
The Borda Count
Like preferential voting, the Borda count uses the entire
preference order of participants, but instead of reallo-
cating the votes as is done under preferential voting, the
preferences are tallied. When there are n alternatives, the
best alternative gets n – 1 points, the second n – 2 points,
the third n – 3 points, and so on. The least preferred
option scores zero. The Borda counts for preferences
shown in Table 4 are given in Table 6. The Borda tally
Table 6. Hypothetical Borda counts for 3 individuals (I) for 3 alterna-
tives (A) applied to the preferences in Table 4.
A1 A2 A3
I1 2 1 0
I2 1 0 2
I3 1 2 0
Tally 4 3 2
aggregates individual preferences to generate the group’s
preferences. The tallies in Table 6 suggest the ranks R =
(A1 > A2 > A3).
The Borda count has been used to aggregate prefer-
ences in many contexts (Black 1958; Hwang & Lin 1987).
Kijazi and Kant (2010) used a Borda count to establish
group preferences for alternatives for forest use onMount
Kilimanjaro. Laukkanen et al. (2005) and Hiltunen et al.
(2008) evaluated group preferences for forest manage-
ment plans in Finland, applying several voting methods
including the Borda count. Laukkanen et al. (2005) asked
individuals to provide an ordering of forest plans on each
of several criteria with approval voting and then used
the Borda count to combine individual preferences into
a group ordering.
Condorcet Functions
A Condorcet winner has the appealing property that it
is preferred to any other alternative by a majority of
the voters (see Elkind et al. 2011). Condorcet functions
find the preferred alternative by examining all pairwise
comparisons of alternatives for each individual (a total
of n × (n – 1)/2 comparisons for n alternatives). Each
individual votes on each comparison. The score for an
alternative is given by the number of times it is ranked
higher than another. That is, Oi(Aj, Ak) = 1 if and only if
Aj i Ak and O(Aj) is summed over n alternatives and m
individuals:
O(Aj ) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
k=1
Oi(Aj , Ak). (2)
For example, Table 7 gives the preferences of 4 indi-
viduals for 3 alternatives. The resulting table of ordinal
preferences, O, and resulting Condorcet scores are given
in Table 8. The O(A1) is the sum of columns O(A1, A2),
and O(A1, A3) = 6, O(A2) = 2, and O(A3) = 3 so that R =
(A1 > A3 > A2).
Ghanbarpour et al. (2005) and Zendehdel et al. (2010)
used a Condorcet function to aggregate group opinions
about management alternatives for a watershed in Iran.
Pairwise procedures such as the Condorcet function ig-
nore portions of the information that are used by other
procedures such as the Borda count and preferential vot-
ing. Of course, simple majority voting ignores evenmore.
Conservation Biology
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Table 7. Hypothetical ordinal preferences of 4 individuals (I) for 3
alternatives (A).
A1 A2 A3
I1 1 3 2
I2 1 3 2
I3 3 1 3
I4 1 3 2
Table 8. Condorcet scores for pairwise comparisons of alternatives in
Table 7.
O O O O O O
(A1, A2) (A1, A3) (A2, A1) (A2, A3) (A3, A1) (A3, A2)
I1 1 1 0 0 0 1
I2 1 1 0 0 0 1
I3 0 0 1 1 0 0
I4 1 1 0 0 0 1
Tallies 3 3 1 1 0 3
Other Functions
Many other voting systems have been developed. They
have not been used widely for environmental decision
making, but we document them so that readers may
pursue them if they require a particular feature for a
specific context.
Variants of the Condorcet function, including
Copeland’s function (Hwang & Lin 1987), select alter-
natives based on pairwise comparisons, their differences
depending on the form of the comparisons (e.g., Craven
1992; Risse 2001). Dodgson’s (1876) function orders al-
ternatives according to the number of pairwise compar-
isons that would require alteration for an alternative to
be preferred to all others (Hwang & Lin 1987; Elkind
et al. 2011).
In the Hare system, sometimes called 2-stage plurality,
individuals cast one vote for one alternative. These are
tabulated and the alternative with the smallest tally is
removed from A. This process is repeated until one alter-
native remains. Hare voting requires that votes be tallied
and results disseminated before another round of voting
can take place, significantly increasing the complexity of
the voting process.
Nanson’s (1883) function identifies preferences
through iterative application of the Borda count (Hwang
& Lin 1987). Alternatives with the lowest Borda count are
sequentially eliminated until a set of alternatives with the
same Borda count remains. Group preferences derived
from Nanson’s function may differ from those derived
from simple Borda counts.
Fishburn’s (1977) function gives a group preference
A1 > A2 if and only if A1 outscores or ties A2 by sim-
ple majority and A1 outscores or ties at least one other
alternative that outscores A2. Kemeny’s (1959) func-
tion scores alternatives by the number of times each
is ranked higher than another. Its goal is to maximize
the agreement between final group preferences and in-
Table 9. Flaws of voting systems (modified from Nurmi 2012; see
Richelson 1981).
Voting systema
Simple
Criteria Majority Approval Preference Borda Condorcet
Condorcet
winner is
chosen
0 0 0 0 1
Monotonicity 1 1 0 1 1
Pareto optimality 1 0 1 1 1
Consistentency 1 1 0 1 0
Independenceb 0 0 0 0 0
Invulnerabilityc 1 1 0 1 0
Majority winner 1 0 1 0 1
aNumbers: 1, system satisfies the criterion; 0, system violates crite-
rion.
bIndependence of irrelevant alternatives.
cInvulnerability to no-show paradox.
dividual voters’ preferences; matrix algebra is used to
find a solution (Fishburn 1977; Hwang & Lin 1987).
It is considered far too complex for many voters to
understand.
Some systems allocate multiple votes to each individ-
ual. If individuals may allocate multiple votes to a sin-
gle alternative if they strongly prefer it (e.g., Mendoza
& Prabhu 2009), the method is equivalent to assigning
weights rather than voting. This is sometimes called cu-
mulative voting. New voting systems continue to be de-
veloped. The examples outlined here illustrate the rich-
ness of potential approaches.
Individual preferences can be expressed by the
strength of preferences among alternatives (sometimes
called cardinal data). Data on preference strengths can
be collected via focus groups, deliberative multicriteria
analysis, or remotely via surveys of stated preferences or
willingness to pay (e.g., Saaty 1980; Gregory & Keeney
2002; Chee 2004). These methods often require travel
and face-to-face workshops, extensive sampling proto-
cols, or complex question formats. Cost and fatigue can
make these systems impractical.
Do the Differences Matter?
As illustrated above, counter-intuitive and even unin-
tended outcomes are possible when voting methods are
applied unthinkingly. Riker (1982), Poundstone (2008),
and others argue that because all voting procedures have
at least one serious flaw and opportunities for strategic
manipulation are ubiquitous, voting results cannot ex-
press collective opinion. The list of important properties
of voting systems in Table 9 is incomplete, but even so,
no method satisfies them all.
Arrow’s theorem applies to open and secret ballots,
even when voters are unaware they are voting, such as
when they reveal preferences through their purchases
(French 1986). Saari (2001) notes that the same prob-
lems arise when individuals make choices based on a
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Table 10. Hypothetical measures for each of 11 criteria for 4 candi-
date conservation reserves (based on tables 1.1 and 1.2 in Saari 2001).
Measure Area A Area B Area C Area D
Populations of
threatened species 1
0 20 10 80
Populations of
threatened species 2
4 0 3 2
Populations of
threatened species 3
30 20 18 12
Populations of
threatened species 4
2 9 8 15
Extent of threatened
ecosystem 1
400 50 80 100
Extent of threatened
ecosystem 2
7 0 2 3
Extent of threatened
ecosystem 3
0 25 30 10
Index of water quality 3 7 8 5
Index of cultural value 4 8 6 10
Index of pollination
services
44 80 60 100
Tourism revenue 8 5 2 1
Note: Units of measure: threatened species, number of adults; ecosys-
tem extent, hectares; ecosystem services, constructed scales; tourism
revenue, millions of dollars per annum. The units are omitted on
the table to emphasize interest only in rank of each option for each
criterion.
number of independent and incommensurate criteria, as
is commonplace in conservation management. Consider
an example in which a manager is required to select a
conservation reserve from among 4 areas that contain
4 threatened species, 3 threatened communities, and 4
important ecosystem services. A field survey results in
the data in Table 10.
The scores for the 11 criteria generate a rank order for
the manager’s preference for each reserve. There is no
clear winner over all criteria, and no clear loser, so the
manager cannot eliminate any dominated alternatives. A
natural approach is to select the ‘best of the best’ (Saari,
2001), where the manager finds the top-ranked alterna-
tive for each criterion and selects the option ranked best
most often. This is equivalent to plurality voting.
The manager’s objective may be to avoid making a
bad choice on any of the criteria. One way of doing so
awards votes to an option if it is either first or second
on each criterion. This is equivalent to approval voting.
Alternatively, the manager may wish to account for all
attributes in a balanced fashion, awarding 3 votes to the
best option, 2 to the second best option, and 1 to the
third best option for each criterion. This is equivalent
to Borda count. In this hypothetical but quite realistic
example, area A is chosen under a plurality vote, area B
is chosen under an approval vote, and area D is chosen
under a Borda count or preferential vote.
There are several problems with Table 9 as a basis
for choosing a voting system. First, it is not compre-
hensive about what is good in a system. Some of these
Table 11. An example of a strategic split of votes.
A1 A2 A3
Decision 1 4 5
Decision 2 4 2 3
other attributes have been outlined in the preceding dis-
cussion. Second, the criteria are not equally important
or independent. For example, the Condorcet winner
criterion is strictly incompatible with the consistency
criterion (Young 1974 in Nurmi 2012). Perhaps most
importantly, the potential for violations of the criteria
says nothing about how likely these violations are to
arise in particular circumstances in which the system is
used.
Assessing the likelihood of violations can be difficult
because it relies on assumptions about the distributions
and independence of preferences (see Nurmi 2012). In
general, though, given strong preferences (full ordering
of preferences), a small numbers of voters (less than
about 10) or many alternatives (more than about 10),
as might happen in a small committee, it is likely the
Condorcet system will not produce a preferred alterna-
tive. The probabilities of intransitive outcomes are even
greater than failing to find a Condorcet winner (Klahr
1966; Jones et al. 1995). In contrast, such problems are
unlikely to arise if there are many voters with weak pref-
erences (such that individuals may be indifferent to some
alternatives), few alternatives (Jones et al. 1995), a few
relatively strong candidates (Tangian 2000), or coalitions
of voters with similar preferences (Nurmi 2012).
All voting rules are susceptible to strategic manipula-
tion to greater or lesser degrees (Satterthwaite 1975). Peo-
ple designing voting systems may manipulate outcomes
by including alternatives so that votes for a preferred
alternative are split among 2 or more similar alternatives
(Gibbard 1973). It may be in the best interests of a voter
to vote for an alternative other than the one they pre-
fer most, or not to vote at all, to secure their desired
result (Kangas & Kangas 2002). A major drawback of
simple majority voting, for example, is that it is relatively
easy to manipulate by introducing irrelevant alternatives
(Lehtinen 2008). Consider the preferences in Table 11
(derived from Table 2). Under simple majority voting, A2
is selected (decision 1). A personwho controls the design
of the voting system may have a personal preference for
A1. If they know the likely distribution of votes among
the alternatives, they may add another alternative with at-
tributes similar to A2, in which case A1 would be selected
if votes were now distributed evenly across A2 and the
new alternative (decision 2).
Strategic voting and coalitions have been explored at
length in political science (see Taylor 1995; Hodge &
Klima 2005). Generally, manipulation requires the sys-
tem designer or the voter to know about other voters’
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preferences. Voters with more information have more
power. For instance, approval voting is more difficult
to manipulate than simple majority voting because it re-
quires additional information about the distribution of
approvals (Lepelley & Valognes 2003). Thomas et al.
(2010) showed how strategic voting behavior may evolve
over time into special interest-driven voting blocks that
“capture” state agencies, leading to decisions about the
environment by public regulatory agencies that accord
with commercial or recreational interests.
Discussion
Many decisions in conservation biology and environmen-
tal science involve reconciling disparate, competing ob-
jectives and thus may be viewed as attempts to maximize
net social welfare. We described the characteristics of
some common voting systems and outlined examples
from environmental science and conservation biology.
Most of the application papers that we reviewed merely
described the voting system used, without justifying its
selection.
As noted above, characteristics of voting systems that
may be crucial weaknesses in one situation may be irrele-
vant in another. Although comprehensive analysis of the
strengths and weaknesses of different voting systems is
complex (Elkind et al. 2011; Nurmi 2012), it is possible to
compare the behavior of candidate systems in particular
circumstances using simulations (Gavish &Gerdes 1997).
People designing or choosing voting systems might use
simulations to anticipate potential manipulations and im-
plement measures to mitigate them, if such manipulative
voting strategies are judged unfair.
Voting systems embody different philosophies. For ex-
ample, winners under Condorcet voting can defeat every
other alternative in pairwise contests. They almost always
win under approval voting. However, under preferential
voting, they often lose because they split the vote with
one or more moderate alternatives. A Condorcet win-
ner may be defeated through manipulation by individual
voters or coalitions of voters. Approval voting, however,
ensures the election of a Condorcet winner, encouraging
sincere voting (Brams & Sanver 2006).
Preferential voting encourages honest support for al-
ternatives that are unlikely to succeed. In simple ma-
jority voting, in contrast, voters may decide against vot-
ing for their preferred candidate if they are unlikely to
win, believing their vote would be effectively wasted.
Instead, they may vote for a generally more favored al-
ternative, rather than risk a much less preferred alterna-
tive being selected. That is, people may use knowledge
about the preferences of other voters to make strate-
gic voting decisions. Preferential voting takes the full
order of preferences into account. If a person’s first
preference is eliminated early, their vote is reallocated
to their second preference. People do not have to an-
ticipate the favored alternatives to be sure their prefer-
ences will count in determining the final outcome (Brams
2004).
The myriad properties and sensitivities of alternative
voting systems raise the important question, what are
the qualities of a desirable outcome? Do we prefer to
come away with everyone moderately pleased, or some
people very pleased and others disgruntled? As previ-
ously noted, every voting system has at least one flaw.
Many people, including those engaged in environmental
decision making, trust voting systems to aggregate pref-
erences fairly. Yet, most people are unaware that the
outcome of voting may be determined by interactions
between properties of the system and strategic behavior
of other voters. Every voting system may seem unfair, at
least in some circumstances. The people responsible for
designing voting systems should be explicit about their
choice, the possibilities of counterintuitive outcomes,
and its susceptibility to strategic manipulation.
If one were to abandon voting, the only realistic op-
tion would be to ask for more information, that is, car-
dinal, rather than ordinal, preferences, expressing how
much one alternative is preferred over another. Mea-
sures of individual benefit, equity, or efficiency of so-
cial welfare avoid many of the difficulties that arise in
voting systems (Sen 1999). For example, Chakravarty
and Kaplan (2010) outline circumstances in which it
may be preferable to allow people to express how
much they care about an alternative and to have the
strength of the preference contribute to the outcome.
One may elicit cardinal preferences and combine them
in a number of ways. However, it is unclear to what
extent such systems satisfy a range of relevant, desir-
able criteria equivalent to those that apply to voting sys-
tems (Nurmi 2012). And as noted above, they may be
costly and time consuming. In a rare example, Phillips
et al. (2010) considered a case like that outlined in
Table 10 and evaluated a suite of quantitative systems
against a set of desirable properties. Many more such
studies are required.
For environmental decisions involving multiple
stakeholders, voting systems can be effective tools
for policy makers to generate group decisions from
individual preferences. It is clear from this review that
the choice of voting system involves social judgments
about what sort of voting system is most fair. Participants
in environmental decision making groups should have
the opportunity to scrutinize alternative voting systems
before one is chosen.
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